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Introduction
From the description of a field problem (i.e., designing decision aids for air traffic controllers),
this paper points out how a cognitive engineering approach provides the milestones for the
evaluation of future joint human-machine systems.
The European air traffic control (ATC) system has entered a deep crisis: this system is
unable to face a tremendous increase of the demand. This is not only the consequence of its
inertia since such inertia is normal for any complex system. Short term measures to optimize the
present tools appear to be insufficient; these tools have already reached the limits of their
evolution capability. A large discussion on how to enhance ATC methods and tools is open.
Very ambitious goals are assigned to the future systems, such as the French CAUTRA V
project, which plans to double the capacity of the system by the year 2005 and to significantly
increase safety. Numerous ambitious projects exist, but none of them has already proved its
efficiency or even its feasibility. ATC automation is really short of effective solutions.
Obviously, major technology improvements (FMS, Data Link, 4D-Navigation,
computational power) must be extensively used, but in the meantime, full automation cannot be
a solution (at least for the next two or three decades); human controllers must remain in the
decision making loop. As automation cannot replace human operators, it must assist them.
This is a paradox of automationexisting within the ATC system: as long as full automation
feasibility and efficiency will not be proved (i.e., as long as we will need controllers to make
decisions, even in an intermittent way) it is essential to preserve the controllers' skills. No
matter the tools that will be designed, in is imperative that human controllers continue to
exercise their skills.
Human operators are marked by of flexibility, of capability to deal with unexpected
situations, of creativity, and of safety, thanks to their capability to compensate for machine's
failures or inadequacies. To preserve these capabilities, we may have to automate "less" than
possible from a purely technological point of view.
In the mean time, the human operators are an error factor. From this observation, and for
years, system designers thought that the more human operators to be put into a system, the
more the risk of error would decrease. In fact, they add another kind of difficulty to the
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supervision of the initial system: the difficulty of understanding the behavior of the automatisms
that partly monitor the system. Thus, automation makes the operators loose their skills as they
know less about the initial system. It creates additional sources of errors and, as reported in
numerous examples, the consequences of these errors are much more important than the
previous ones. Instead of eliminating human operators with the consequences of depriving the
joint system of major benefits and of increasing the risk of errors, it seems more sensible to
design a system which is error-tolerant. Such a system cannot be designed only from the
technical advances: we must automate in a different way than suggested by the use of
technology alone.
The consequences are very important for the design of the future system as well as for its
validation. Intuitively, we must not only validate the machine components of the joint system,
but we must also verify that the human-machine cooperation works well. As we need to take
advantage of the human as a factor of safety and flexibility, we must prove that this requirement
is fulfilled. Some aspects of validation can be less critical than with fully automated systems.
Verification and Validation From a Cognitive Engineering Point of
View
Cognitive Engineering
Cognitive Engineering as a Method of Designing New Tools. Cognitive engineering has arisen
from the expression of a need by numerous system designers: the need to understand what
really makes the task difficult for the operators, how this difficulty impairs human performance
in order to define the most effective aids (Rasmussen, 1986; De Montmollin & DeKeyser,
1985; Hollnagel 1988), etc. Cognitive engineering is about the multidimensional open worlds
which are the effective working context of the operators (Woods & Roth, 1988). Its aim is to
understand and describe the present mental activity of operators, given their present tools, and
how these mental mechanisms decay under time pressure, fatigue and stress. Cognitive
engineering also enables the human factors professional to anticipate how new technologies will
modify the activity of operators.
We must not only elicit the knowledge of operators, we must first understand how this
knowledge is activated and utilized in the actual problem solving environment. The central
question is not to identify the domain knowledge possessed by the practitioner, but rather to
point out under which conditions this knowledge is (or is no longer) accessible. This is the
problem of defining a validity domain for human performance. Cognitive engineering must also
identify and predict the sources of error and the mechanisms of error (Hollnagel, 1991).
When several agents can act on the system, under which conditions can they cooperate
efficiently under time pressure? What are the mental resources that are involved and what is the
cognitive cost of cooperation (Woods & Roth, 1988)?
Then we have to point out how the present tools are inadequate and determine how the
operators compensate for the deficiencies of their tools. Thus, we have to examine how tools
provided for an operator are really used by the operators.
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Cognitive Engineering as a Method of Validating These Tools. This whole analysis enables us
to explain the cognitive model of the operator which is central to defining a global approach to
design effective decision aids. In the meantime, this model provides a guideline for validating
the joint human-machine system. Validation has no meaning per se; we have to validate
according to some criteria which one has to specify. Cognitive engineering enables one to point
out the weak aspects of the system as well as those of the human-machine interaction. Thus, it
enables the transformation of high level validation requirements into relevant criteria to test the
joint human-machine system. It determines which aspects of the machine or of the human-
machine interaction must be verified closely so as to guarantee an effective performance of the
whole system or to prevent error. Then one can determine or assess the gains along these
dimensions.
We must verify that the new joint human-machine system preserves the sources of strong
performance and really improves the weak points from a safety point of view as well as from
capacity. This suggests that we must assess the performance of the new system with reference
to the previous one in real conditions, i.e., whatever the variability of the real world is.
In the meantime, some crucial questions one should always ask are: does the new system
preserve the sources of good performance of the operator, or does it preserve the capability of
the operator to deal with unanticipated situations or machine deficiencies? These questions
become more important as we consider cognitive tools.
Cognitive engineering provides a relevant framework within which one might answer basic
questions such as: who has to determine validation criteria, when do we have to experiment so
as to verify these criteria, and how and where to experiment? As cognitive engineering is an
iterative process at any cycle after designing new tools, the experiments enable one to determine
how the global human-machine system evolves, how the bottlenecks in the operator's activity
evolve, disappear, decay or are created; what kinds of problems are solved and created by the
new system, the new human-machine cooperation philosophy, and what are the consequences
of this philosophy on operators' training.
A Field Study: The Case of Air Traffic Controllers
Method
The following is the description of ERATO, a project which is aimed at defining an Electronic
Assistant for en-route air traffic controllers. This electronic assistant will include several
decision aids. Figure 1 shows that this project includes seven different phases.
At first, we have to elicit the cognitive model of the controllers (1). This model explains the
mental mechanisms which are common to all controllers and which enable them to process data
and to make real time decision. These mental processes are analyzed for the executive
controller, the planning controller and then for both controllers as a whole in order to assess the
consequences of cooperation on mental load as well as on global performance. The main goal
remains to describe the mental mechanisms involved in decision making process and how these
mechanisms evolve and decay under time pressure.
The bottlenecks assessment (2) is a diagnosis phase: we have to point out the sources of
poor and good performances of the air traffic controllers given their actual working context. As
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longasthesituationisnotoodemanding,controllerscancompensateforthesebottlenecks;but
in verydemandingsituationsthesebottlenecksmayseverelyimpairthecontrollers'
performance.Theassessmentofbottlenecksthenenablesonetospecifythebasicfunctionsof
effectivedecisionaids(3).Thespecificationftheinterface(4)also depends on the cognitive
model. We need to know in which context these tools will be operated so as to optimize their
use.
Cognitive ModeIv&vOfthe Controllers J
Interface's J
Specification
V&V
Bottleneck's J
Assessment
V&V
Tools'
Specification
V&V
Logical Representation
V&V
I .__..l_t Expert SystemV&V
Tools Design: The Controller's Electronic Assistant JV&V I
J Evaluation of the New Man-Machine System JIV&V
Figure 1. Seven phases for electronic assistant
To defme a logical representation of the model (5), we need to combine different laboratory
logic so as to build a logical tool adapted to formalize controller's knowledge. The design of the
function defined during step (3) involves the use of an expert system which models large
subsets of controller's knowledge (6). The expert system provides the two Electronic
Assistants with relevant data, so we have to face the problem of the integration of the expert
system to real time functions so as to design the two electronic assistants (7).
What Really Makes the Task Difficult
They have to process data which depend on the time factor for:
• Their value
• Their accuracy. When observing air traffic controllers, we found that they spent a lot of
time, and a lot of cognitive resources, in eliminating ambiguity. A major reason why
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controllers are often unable to make a clear assessment of the situation is based on their
representation of predicted time intervals: unless we sink into pure fatalism, we do not
anticipate that an event will happen "at" a given time but "about" a given time. The
difference is fraught with consequences for the operator.
• Their availability. All the data necessary to make a clear assessment of the situation are
not available at a given time; some of them may be definitely unattainable. The operator
may have to take decisions in a state of partial ignorance.
• Their flow. The controllers must deal with any cases comprising the dual aspects of
both time-dependent information-processing and real-time decision making as: (i)
dynamicity vs. inertia of the system or of any subsystem, (ii) lack of data vs. data
overflow, and (iii) prolonged low workload vs. tasks overflow. We must also consider
the question of how operators can adapt to sudden transitions from any of these aspects
to the dual one, for example from a situation of lack of data to a data overflow.
• Data presentation is technology driven and uselessly bulky. Tasks and objectives are not
well defined and may severely compete. Risk is so important that the controller has to
guard against errors from all the actors (including the machines) in the system.
A Rapid Overview of the Controller's Cognitive Model
The controller anticipates, according to a "normal" routine, behavior of the aircraft in what is
called the default world, with reference to the "default logic" that models this kind of reasoning.
This default behavior is illustrated by controllers when they use sentences as "normally this
aircraft going to Paris Orly will start descent about 30 NM before this fix." The controller does
not know the top of descent, but from his experience, he knows that "this will normally happen
about here," so he will ignore all potential conflicts that should happen if the given aircraft
should start descending earlier to focus all his activity on the most probable conflicts. This is an
efficient means of narrowing the range of contingencies to be examined and to increase
efficiency: at first all the aircraft are processed as if their behavior always remain consonant
with the "normal" behavior.
But to process exceptions, that is to guarantee safety, controllers monitor "sentry
parameters." As long as these parameters remain in a "normal" range, all the previous
diagnoses or decisions that are inferred from the default world remain valid. But if a sentry
parameter drifts outsides the expected range, then all the previous plausible inferences have to
be revised; some additional conflicts can be created, due to this abnormal behavior. In normal
situations, this way of reasoning is an efficient and safe way of making decisions in a state of
partial ignorance. But we can observe that, in very demanding situations, the monitoring task
may no longer be performed by the controllers. Thus, when outside its validity domain (in too
demanding situations), this mechanism may become a major source of errors.
Very often, diagnosis is the result of an ambiguity elimination mechanism. Even when
remaining in the default world, the controller is often unable to assess a definite diagnosis.
Controllers spend a large amount of time in ambiguity elimination processes. Allowing a doubt
is a luxury for the controller; the mastery of doubt is an art. This is performed by associating
one (or two) relevant parameter(s) to each undecided situation. To avoid a scattering of
resources, these parameters will remain the only ones monitored.
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Eachconflictingsituation, certain or potential, triggers several resolution frames. These
frames are a part of the knowledge base common to all controllers. For example, let us consider
the following situation: two aircraft converge over the same point, the second climbs through
the level of the first. This canonical situation can trigger three resolution frames :
* Clear the climbing aircraft directly to the requested level, under radar monitoring
• Radar vectoring
• Clear the climbing aircraft to a safety level until both have flown over the fix.
A part of the controller's activity is devoted to choose the best frame. Each of these frames
may be relatively demanding. In demanding situations, the cognitive cost becomes a basic
criteria to choose a frame. Of course while resolving a problem, the controller may have to shift
from an inoperative frame to a more relevant one.
According to the assessment of the workload, the controller can instanciate a resolution
frame in a more or less efficient way. The controller can also abandon a more elegant frame to
shift to a more efficient one: this is the consequence of his or her own resource management
policy, according to the problems occurring at a particular time.
All of these mechanisms are a part of the real time data process. This process results in a
problem driven organization of the raw data set.
To solve a given conflict, the controller may have to perform actions within far-off time
intervals. These time intervals may be very short; if a controller misses the right time span to act
on traffic, the very nature and complexity of the problem may change rapidly.
The only way to avoid this is to frequently monitor the position of the relevant aircraft.
Obviously this mechanisms is very costly. The controller must shift frequently from one
problem to another and, at each shift, must restore the resolution context. When conflicts are
complex and under time pressure, this may become a critical task.
Most of the previous tasks can be performed by two controllers, successively or in parallel.
Mental mechanisms involved in cooperation are an essential part of the model. Efficient
cooperation between the two controllers relies on three factors.
They must have
• The same skills, knowledge and training
• The same representation of effective traffic requirements
• Simultaneously available cognitive resources to exchange information.
When demand increases, these two latter conditions may decay so much that cooperation
may no longer be effective. Numerous near misses have been reported due to cooperation
failure in too demanding situations. One controller did not even know that some tasks were
urgent and important while the other controller thought that these tasks were normally
performed. This points out the limits of cooperation based on implicit tasks delegation.
ImprovingAirTrafficControl:ProvingNewTools... 281
Conclusion: Validity Domain of all the Mental Processes
All these mental mechanisms have a validity domain. We can easily observe how their
efficiency decays under stress, time pressure or fatigue.
For example, in demanding situations, the sentry parameters are less monitored and this may
lead to errors when an abnormal behavior is not detected soon enough. We can also observe
that the assessment of a given situation, including conflict detection and resolution assessment,
needs a few tenth of seconds while it can lay on 7 to 8 minutes in very demanding situations; in
this case, the controller is confronted with problems associated to numerous shifts from this
conflict to concomitant ones, as described before and the risk of error (forgetting a relevant
aircraft, choosing the wrong resolution frame, etc.) is high. The validity domain of the mental
processes directly depend on the number of aircraft that have to be processed by the controller.
This is the reason why we focused on a problem driven presentation of the information.
The efficiency of the mental processes also depends on the capability of the operator to focus
his attention on the relevant problem at the right time.
Justification of the Tools
This analysis, which corresponds to phases 3 and 4 of the project, is the key point of the
approach. It explains the reasons why each tool has been designed, and the improvements of
the joint Human-Machine system that are expected. It also defines the criteria to experiment this
system. At this level, there is a deep symbiosis between design and validation; however, this
can no longer be true during the experiments.
Information Filtering
Justification. The aim of problem-driven information filtering is to reduce the number of aircraft
to be considered at one time. By splitting a too demanding situation in several subsets of
aircraft, we can expect that the controllers will have the capability to process these subsets of
aircraft very efficiently. As we do not provide the controllers with the results of an automatic
conflict detection and resolution, they will have to operate all their mental mechanisms to assess
the situation. This should preserve their skills and their capability to deal with any unanticipated
situation more properly then now. The expected gain is that, as they will be working on
appropriate subsets of aircraft, these mental mechanisms will be much more efficient than now.
Thus, we will have to verify that this human-machine cooperation philosophy enhances:
• The way they anticipate in a state of partial ignorance
• The associated sentry-parameters' monitoring processes
• The ambiguity elimination processes: the definite assessment of the situation should be
made earlier than now.
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• Thechoice of the relevant resolution frame should be made earlier than now and
instanciated in a more "elegant" way.
• The cooperation between controllers should be improved. The information filtering is
supposed to enhance the definition of the mental representation. Both controllers'
mental representations of the situation should remain consistent over time, as they will
be able to update it very easily.
Design Problems. The role allotted to the expert system is to provide the electronic assistants
with adequate data in order to show how to organize the raw data in a problem-driven way.
Information filtering techniques are under dispute (DeKeyser, 1987). The point is how to make
sure that the operator will not need data that is hidden by the system. Data retention and access
should not be a source of errors.
In order to answer these precise questions, the expert system must not only encode an
exhaustive model of the controller, but we must also carefully define its role in the system.
Description of the Expert System. The first version of the expert system included about 3,000
Prolog fast order rules. It processes the same set of data as the controllers have to process now
(i.e., the information from the strips) and, when available, the radar information. It includes
two main modules. The first computes the default representation of each aircraft. From this
representation, the second module associates to each aircraft its relevant environment, called the
interfering aircraft subset (IAS).
This environment is composed of:
• The subset of all conflicting aircraft. These conflicts may be certain or potential. This
subset is not determined by means of a pure mathematical computation, but rather
according to the current expertise of controllers.
• The subset of all the aircraft that may interfere with a "normal" radar resolution of the
conflict; that is, all aircraft that may constrain conflict resolution. A normal resolution
is a solution which is consistent with the current know-how of controllers.
The relevant environment of an aircraft is typically a problem-driven filtering of information.
The IAS represents the relevant working context associated to an aircraft. Such an environment
embodies traffic requirements and all information that may be useful to fulfill these
requirements. The number of rules is explained by the need to represent current knowledge of
the controllers so as to make sure that information faltering really meets the controller's needs.
The definition of the relevant environment is: "according to the traffic requirements,
provided the EC works normally, he may need all, or a part of, the displayed data, but he will
in no way need any other data."
Discussion. The discussion on the exhaustiveness and the relevance of data filtered by the
expert system is central.
• The fast answer consists in taking into account the default behavior of the aircraft in a
more "prudent" way than the controller. This will result in the display of some aircraft
that may be not relevant for the controller. In the most demanding situations (more
than 25 aircraft in the sector), the most numerous IAS never include more than 12
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aircraft.If oneortwoadditionalircraftaredisplayed,thisisnotreallyaproblem.In
allcases,thenumberofaircraftdisplayedasaresultofinformationfiltering remains
lower than the maximum efficient processing-capability (about 15 aircraft), while the
initial number was largely above this figure.
• The system detects all potentially abnormal behavior of an aircraft in order to advise
the controller as soon as possible and to update information filtering accordingly. In
future versions, this mechanism should be performed using FMS/Data-Link
capabilities.
• But these two first answers do not really solve the problem. The knowledge elicited in
the expert system defines a set of "normal behaviors" of the controllers. But whatever
the number of rules can be, it is impossible to represent the whole knowledge of all the
controllers. Should we be able to do this, we should have to deal with controllers'
errors or creativity. The solution defined in Erato consists of considering the expert
system as a default representation of the controllers. To guard against the
consequences of human error or creativity, (i.e., unexpected behavior) a monitoring
process exists. This process is inspired by the natural sentry-parameters' monitoring
process of the controllers. This monitoring process will detect any discrepancy
between the actual position of all aircraft and any of the possible position as it could
result from a "normal" behavior of the controller. When necessary, this process will
trigger an alarm to advise the controller that the previous information filtering is no
longer relevant and has been updated. We have to make sure that this mechanism is
efficient in demanding situations, and that the controller is not overwhelmed by the
warnings. In other terms, the expert system must be accurate enough.
This monitoring process associated with the expert system allows the electronic assistant to
smoothly adapt to operator error and creativity. Such information filtering is error tolerant.
These results are used by several functions of the electronic assistant: simulation of
problem's resolution, extrapolation, memorization aid, data transfer from one device to the
other, cognitive-resources-management aid. The problem-driven information filtering allows
the controller to concentrate on well-formulated problems in order to operate in a more efficient
and creative way. This function substitutes a set of easily manageable problems for the initial
complex situation. The basic information filtering will be used by all the functions of the
Electronic Assistant.
The Extrapolation Function
Justification. This function will enable both controllers to improve problem formulation. As
long as the aircraft are not in radar contact, the controller has to process data from the strips. In
demanding situations, it is easy to observe that the strips are not read in an exhaustive way,
which can cause severe errors. This function will display the situation at any future time, taking
into account the default behavior of all the aircraft. It substitutes a graphical display for an
alphanumeric representation of data, and this will improve the choice of the right resolution
frames. It will also enable the controller to more easily assess where uncertainty lies, and
consequently to more efficiently point out the parameters which are relevant to eliminate
ambiguity.
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Design Problems. It is commonly admitted that operators spend a significant part of their
activity in compensating for tool deficiencies. An ill-adapted interface can significantly devalue
the results of information filtering. We have suggested that very often the reference used by the
controller is not a temporal one but a spatial one: the question "when will you act on this
aircraft" is answered "There." Thus, the interface will enable the controller to drag an aircraft
along its trajectory with the mouse; all the other aircraft will move accordingly. This interface
responds in the way the controller anticipates. In some situations, the controller refers to a
temporal reference. The interface will display simultaneously the time corresponding to the
simulated position of the aircraft. However, should this interface have had only one of these
references, the controller should have had to mentally convert distances into time intervals. In
demanding situations this could represent a significant additional workload.
Simulation Functions. These functions will allow the controller to experiment with different
resolution frames and to answer questions such as "what would happen if I climb this aircraft
to..." or "Is it better to set course directly to..." The expert system will deliver the simulated
information filtering. These answers will be updated until the controller has made a decision.
For the time being, the controllers have no tool that assists them in performing this task.
Memorization Aids. The controller will have the ability to indicate the trajectory section where
he intends to vector an aircraft. When the aircraft flies over this point (or abeam), a warning
will be triggered; then, after having consulted the filtered information, the controller will initiate
his decision. This should solve both problems of keeping onto memory the "right time to act"
and context-resolution real-time updating.
Data Transfer Between Electronic Assistants
This function as aimed at improving cooperation between controllers. It enables them to transfer
any filtered information or simulated result from one position to the other. Using this small set
of data, the two controllers will have the same mental representation of the requirements of the
situation. The capability to save incoming messages into a letter box until the controller has time
to process them should help to solve the problem of simultaneous availability of both
controllers to exchange information.
The Reminder
Justification. We observed how it may become difficult for the controller to focus complete
attention on the right problem at the right time. The reminder consists of a specific window of
the electronic assistant where each problem will be associated a label. A problem is defined as a
conflicting situation involving two or more aircraft. The labels are positioned according to the
urgency, and the display of the relative urgency of problems should enable the controller to
avoid wasting cognitive resources on non-urgent and unimportant tasks while the short term
situation decays. In normal operations, this should allow the controller to objectively manage
all cognitive resources.
The aim of the reminder is to show what the traffic requirements are and their urgency to the
two controllers. There are several ways to split a given situation into relevant problems. This
variability can be observed for several different controllers as well as for any given controller,
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accordingtohiscognitiver sourcesmanagementphilosophy.Themorethesituationisfeltto
bedemanding,themorethecontrollerwillsplitit in"little"problemsandsolvetheseproblems
inaverytacticalway:withshortermsolutions.If thecontrollerfeelsthatthesituationis
masteredheorshewillconsidertheselementaryproblemsa apartofawholeandsolvethem
inamorestrategicway.Statistically,aboutaquarterof theproblemsmaybemoreor less
brokendown,whilethethreeotherquartersarealwaysdescribedin thesamewayby
controllers.
Design Problems. The reminder will propose labels by default. Most of these labels will
correspond to the effective needs of the controller; some will not. Thus, the controller will have
the capability of editing these labels.
When a situation can be described as a single problem or as several problems, the reminder
will propose the simplest situation for three reasons:
• It corresponds to the need of the controller when the situation is the most demanding.
If the controller wants to concatenate some sub-problems, the situation is probably not
too demanding, and there is time to do this properly. This is a means of avoiding
clumsy automation: the interface assists the operator more in the most demanding
situations.
• It is easier to concatenate the labels then to split them.
• This enables the system to point out more information on each sub-problem.
Validation Techniques
Classically, we define dependability as that property of a computing system which allows
reliance to be justifiably placed on the service it delivers (Laprie, 1987). We can point out four
classical methods regarding dependability-procurement or dependability-validation: fault
avoidance, fault tolerance, fault removal and fault forecasting. These definitions can be applied
to a complex heterogeneous human-machine system as the ATC system as well as to any of its
machine components. In the first case, the users are the airlines (or their passengers), while in
the second case the user is defined as the controller or any subsystem.
The specification of decision aids relies on a philosophy of future human-machine
cooperation, whether this philosophy is clearly defined or not. The central question is to make
sure that this cooperation fulfills the initial requirements regarding capacity and safety. To
answer this question, we have to choose the right parameters to be evaluated and then determine
the minimum set of experiments to get a significant amount of data (Woods & Sarter, 1992).
Some basic questions must be answered about the robustness of the joint human-machine
system: is it error tolerant (Foster, 1992)? Does its organization allow a quick and easy
correction of errors (Reason, 1992)?
The design of decision aids implies an analysis, either implicit or explicit, of operator
deficiencies and of the most effective means to compensate for these deficiencies. The ultimate
step of the verification and validation process should be the verification of these initial
assumptions (Hopkin, 1992).
286 Gaillard& Leroux
ThevalidationoftheElectronicAssistantis hreefold(Leroux,1992).
Thecognitivemodelhasbeenverifiedthroughtheanalysisof the behavior of air
traffic controllers during simulations of demanding traffic (Leroux, 1991). The
observation of the controllers and their comments enabled us to point out the mental
processes and the bottlenecks as described in the model.
• The philosophy of human-machine cooperation and the specification of the electronic
assistants have already been presented to more than 180 fully qualified controllers.
The expert system is used to provide the various functions of the electronic assistant
with adequate data. To validate this knowledge-based module, we have to check that
the outputs are acceptable by controllers on real conditions; i.e., that they always
include at least the minimum set of information. Although the validation of the
knowledge based module has not been carded out, it has been successfully confronted
to the most usual problems. However, we will have to validate very carefully the
monitoring process, as it guarantees the relevance of the outputs. We must prove that
this mechanism detects all discrepancies between the observed state of the world and
the expected one. The trust of the operator on the machine relies on the efficiency of
this mechanism. Thus, the validation of the knowledge-based module will be twofold:
from a pure dependability point of view and from a human factors point of view. This
will be performed by two different teams with different techniques to experiment.
The fast level of validation of the Electronic Assistant will consist of:
- Experimenting the interface of each function
- Verifying that it really improves the target bottlenecks
- And in making sure that it does not decay some sources of good performance. The
criteria for experimenting with these functions are directly issued from the cognitive
model, as previously described.
Then we will have to assess the validity domain of each function: are they really efficient for
situations where the controller needs an effective aid?
• After that, we will have to validate the electronic assistant as a whole in order to
analyze if the function-as-a-part-of-a-whole looses properties or acquire unexpected
ones.
• Finally, we must assess the performance of the joint human-machine system and
answer questions such as:
- How is this cooperation philosophy is accepted by controllers?
- How will it modify the activity of the controllers?
- Does it enable them to work in a more efficient and creative way?
- Does it provoke a loss of vigilance or of skill?
- Does it improve the global performance, from capacity and safety point of views?
- What are the consequences on training?
- Does it enable a progressive and "soft" integration of technological advances in
avionics?
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